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*Office Memorandum* [REDACTED] ED STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO : Director of Central Intelligence

DATE: 15 December 1956

FROM : ASA/CPD

SUBJECT:

1. The resume of the 12 December OCB luncheon meeting is attached for your approval or alteration. Your luncheon notes are also attached (Tab A).

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*Office Memorandum* [REDACTED] STATES GOVERNMENT

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TO :

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FROM :

SUBJECT:


4. I am returning a memorandum on Polish Aid and Trade dated 5 December (Tab B) which you had initially proposed to use at the 12 December Board meeting, and then, I believe, did not have opportunity to use.

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14 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Resume of OCB Luncheon Meeting, 12 December 1956

PRESENT: Mr. Hoover, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Jackson, Mr. Robertson,  
Mr. Stassen, Mr. Hollister, Mr. Washburn, Mr. Staats




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
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
4. Albania

Mr. Dulles discussed Yugoslav capabilities to influence Albania to take more independent course. Mr. Hoover undertook to secure State's estimates of Yugoslav capabilities and probable Albanian, Greek and Italian reactions. When these estimates are available, Mr. Higgs of State will give CIA an opportunity to compare and comment.

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7. USIA Radio Transmitters in the Middle East

Mr. Washburn indicated that USIA's program for two new transmitters designed to increase its programming in the Middle East had encountered criticism from the Bureau of the Budget. He indicated that in this connection he might need OCB backing at some later date.

8. McKay-Shields Reports

Mr. Dulles and Mr. Washburn reported that their respective agencies already had the McKay-Shields reports which Mr. Gray had commented on at the 5 December luncheon. It was agreed that each agency should undertake to exploit as appropriate.

  
ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

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5 December 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. C. Lloyd Egner  
Special Assistant to CPP

SUBJECT: Polish Aid and Trade.

1. The Beam Committee has been briefed on the question of Polish aid and trade and on the discreet conversations held in Warsaw between Ambassador Jacobs and Polish Economic official Winiewicz.

2. The President offered aid. The Poles, however, have refused outright aid and want credits or loans for machinery, fats and oils, and cotton. This emphasis upon relatively normal trade procedures raises two particular difficulties for the Department of State:

a. By law, surplus agricultural products may not be sold at world market prices to Iron Curtain countries, and

b. The Battle Act prohibits loans and credits to countries supplying Russia with strategic materials.

Solutions must be found to overcome or bypass these obstacles before meaningful conversations can be held with the Poles. Poland has now announced that it is prepared to send three experts to the United States, but the Department of State is not yet prepared to hold official talks.

3. In the meantime Polish officials are attempting to create the impression that the United States is delaying action on the President's aid offer. Their version was given to Times Warsaw correspondent Gruson. The NYTimes held up the story for several days and then published the Gruson article on 4 December emphasizing Polish disappointment over Washington silence on economic assistance.

*L. A. Campbell*

LAUGHLIN A. CAMPBELL

Chief

Information Coordination Division

# Brave Words Made American Dilemma

By Marquis Childs

PARIS—For more than a decade the youth who so courageously led the revolt in Hungary had been incessantly indoctrinated with the Marxist-Leninist dogma at the root of the Soviet system. They got it from primary school on up through the university.

Yet they apparently were untouched by it, responding to the same deeply human Western impulses which this indoctrination was meant to eradicate.



The indoctrination does not necessarily work, and since the indoctrination is the essence of the new society and the great achievements claimed for it, then that society itself is jeopardized and driven back upon itself.

This question is being asked with a certain trepidation in Western Europe by those who understand the paranoid need of the Kremlin bosses for security, for constant reassurance. When Nikita S. Khrushchev snarls angrily at Western diplomats at a reception, he is displaying with less restraint than the others the uncertainties of the moment.

Into what reckless adventures this new gnawing uncertainty may carry the quarreling men of the Kremlin is the fear of thoughtful observers.

THESE same observers, who try to take as dispassionate a view as possible of the Hungarian horror, believe President Eisenhower acted in the hour of crisis with wise restraint, seeking to assure the world that the United States was not exploiting or would not exploit in any way the revolution. Any less restraint might have provoked a general war. That is the opinion, not of sensationalists but of those with sober and long experience in international politics.

The American dilemma as the Hungarian uprising began was an impossible one. To exercise caution and restraint was to bring down the kind of bitter criticism now widespread in Europe. This criticism of the United States goes with the feeling of frustration and futility at having to sit by while a people seeking their freedom are shot down by mass weapons.

A great deal of the criticism was aimed at Radio Free Europe, an American broadcasting station in Munich, Germany, which is partly supported by contributions and partly by government funds. It has been a cold war weapon aimed at maintaining the desire for freedom in the satellite countries.

Both reporters and refugees out of Hungary have charged that RFE broadcasts encouraged thousands of young Hungarians to go on fighting in the belief that American support in the form of arms, planes and troops was coming to their relief.

Some have gone so far as to say that RFE, particularly by broadcasting the statement of Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. at the United Nations that the United States would never let Hungary down, caused the senseless slaughter of thousands of youth. They came repeatedly and in desperation to the American and British legations to ask when help was coming.

THERE already has been talk of a congressional investigation in Washington. If such an investigation could be done carefully and objectively without a blaze of publicity, it might serve a useful purpose, for as Hungary has shown, it is an extremely dubious business for those who sit in safety to play with words capable of stirring courageous and long-suffering men and women to action when action is hopeless.

In the anger and frustration Hungary has stirred, it is natural to seek a scapegoat and that is perhaps RFE's role at present. But any critical and sober investigation should go back to the origins of the "liberation" policy. That word was used by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a speech early in the political campaign of 1952.

In the light of the grisly drama of the past month and a half, most of our assumptions in America have been far too easy. We thought we could do it with words. The Hungarians learned that the words did not mean what they so passionately had hoped they meant.